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Morrison v. National Australia Bank Ltd.1 is the most important
decision construing the geographic scope of a statute in almost twenty
years. This is not just because the Supreme Court in Morrison addresses
the reach of U.S. rules on securities fraud for the first time, but also because
Morrison changes the presumption against extraterritoriality, one of main
interpretive tools that U.S. courts use to determine the reach of federal
statutes. Morrison changes the presumption by shifting its focus from the
location of the conduct to the location of the effects. The change is a good
one for at least two reasons. First, it is consistent with the presumption's
underlying rationale: that Congress is primarily concerned with domestic
conditions. Second, it harmonizes many of the Supreme Court's prior
decisions, allowing order to emerge from a seemingly inconsistent series of
precedents.
The presumption against extraterritoriality was born from the marriage
of the Charming Betsy canon that statutes should be construed not to violate
international law and an international law rule that jurisdiction was
generally territorial.2  During the twentieth century, however, the
presumption against extraterritoriality broke free of international law and
came to rest on other justifications-first on "comity,"3 and then on "the
assumption that Congress is primarily concerned with domestic
conditions."4 But this rule of statutory interpretation was not consistently
applied. In American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., the Supreme Court
invoked the presumption against extraterritoriality to hold that the Sherman
* Professor of Law, University of California, Hastings College of the Law.
1. 130 S. Ct. 2869 (2010).
2. David L. Sloss, Michael D. Ramsey & William S. Dodge, International Law in the
Supreme Court to 1860, in INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THE U.S. SUPREME COURT: CONTINUITY
AND CHANGE 7, 38 (David L. Sloss, Michael D. Ramsey & William S. Dodge eds., 2011).
3. See Am. Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347, 356 (1909).
4. Foley Bros. v. Filardo, 336 U.S. 281, 285 (1949).
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Act did not reach anticompetitive conduct abroad,5 but in United States v.
Sisal Sales Corp. it reversed course and applied the Sherman Act to almost
identical facts.6 Foley Bros. v. Filardo relied on the presumption to hold
that the federal Eight Hour Law did not apply to work in Iraq,7 yet three
years later Steele v. Bulova Watch Co. held that the Lanham Act covered
trademark infringement in Mexico.8 In EEOC v. Arabian American Oil Co.
(Aramco), the Court applied the presumption against extraterritoriality to
Title VII,9 but just two years later it ignored the presumption in Haqford
Fire Insurance Co. v. Calfornia, holding that the Sherman Act reaches
foreign conduct that causes substantial effects in the United States.'o
Over the past decade, the Supreme Court has experimented with other
principles of interpretation to determine the reach of statutes. Justices
Breyer and Ginsburg have articulated and applied new canons such as a
presumption against "unreasonable interference with the sovereign
authority of other nations"" and a presumption that "Congress generally
legislates with domestic conditions in mind."' 2 Justices Scalia and Thomas,
on the other hand, have favored the presumption against extraterritoriality,
often applying it rather mechanically based on the location of the conduct."
Morrison provided Justice Scalia with a vehicle to bolster the
presumption against extraterritoriality, and he did not miss his chance.
Scalia began by quoting Aramco: "It is a 'longstanding principle of
American law that legislation of Congress, unless a contrary intent appears,
is meant to apply only within the territorial jurisdiction of the United
States."'l 4 Aramco had based the presumption on two justifications: (1)
5. 213 U.S. at 355-57.
6. 274 U.S. 268 (1927).
7. 336 U.S. at 285.
8. 344 U.S. 280 (1952).
9. 499 U.S. 244, 248 (1991).
10. 509 U.S. 764, 794-99 (1993).
11. F. Hoffmann-La Roche Ltd. v. Empagran S.A., 542 U.S. 155, 164 (2004).
12. Small v. United States, 544 U.S. 385, 388 (2005) (quoting Smith v. United States, 507
U.S. 197, 204 n.5 (1993)). For further discussion, see William S. Dodge, Loose Canons:
International Law and Statutory Interpretation in the Twenty-First Century, in INTERNATIONAL
LAW IN THE U.S. SUPREME COURT: CONTINUITY AND CHANGE 547 (David L. Sloss, Michael D.
Ramsey & William S. Dodge eds., 2011).
13. See Empagran, 542 U.S. at 176 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment) (stating that U.S.
antitrust laws "should be read in accord with the customary deference to the application of foreign
countries' laws within their own territories"); Pasquantino v. United States, 544 U.S. 349, 371
(2005) (stating that the presumption against extraterritoriality does not apply when conduct occurs
in the United States); Small, 544 U.S. at 400 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (stating that the presumption
against extraterritoriality does not restrict statutes from reaching conduct within U.S. borders).
14. Morrison v. Nat'l Australia Bank Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 2869, 2877 (2010) (quoting EEOC v.
Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244,248 (1991)) (internal quotation omitted).
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that it "serves to protect against unintended clashes between our laws and
those of other nations which could result in international discord;" and (2)
that Congress "'is primarily concerned with domestic conditions.'" 5 The
first justification became difficult to maintain after the Court applied the
presumption in situations presenting no risk of conflict with foreign law, 16
and Morrison officially jettisoned it.17  Thus, the presumption now rests
solely "on the perception that Congress ordinarily legislates with respect to
domestic, not foreign matters." 8
Justice Scalia also used Morrison to articulate a standard for
overcoming the presumption against extraterritoriality: "When a statute
gives no clear indication of an extraterritorial application, it has none."19
This does not mean that the presumption is a "clear statement rule"-
"[a]ssuredly context can be consulted as well"-but some "clear indication
of extraterritoriality" was required.20 Morrison also noted that even "when
a statute provides for some extraterritorial application, the presumption
against extraterritoriality operates to limit that provision to its terms." 21
Finally, Morrison tried to resolve the uncertainty about when the
presumption applies: "Rather than guess anew in each case [about what
Congress would have wanted], we apply the presumption in all cases,
preserving a stable background against which Congress can legislate with
predictable effects."22
Morrison was an odd vehicle for interpreting and applying the
presumption against extraterritoriality because the fraudulent conduct
alleged in the complaint occurred in the United States. But that fact did not
mean that Section 10(b) necessarily applied. "[F]urther analysis" was
required-specifically an analysis of the statute's "focus." 2 3 Justice Scalia
concluded "that the focus of the Exchange Act is not upon the place where
15. Aramco, 499 U.S. at 248 (quoting Foley Bros. v. Filardo, 336 U.S. 281, 285 (1949)).
16. See, e.g., Sale v. Haitian Centers Council, Inc., 509 U.S. 155, 173-74 (1993)
(Immigration and Nationality Act on the high seas); Smith v. United States, 507 U.S. 197, 204 n.5
(1993) (Federal Tort Claims Act in Antarctica).
17. 130 S. Ct. at 2877-78 ("The canon or presumption applies regardless of whether there is a
risk of conflict between the American statute and a foreign law.").
18. Id at 2877; see also id. ("'[W]e must presume [Congress] is primarily concerned with
domestic conditions."') (quoting Aramco, 499 U.S. at 248).
19. Id. at 2878.
20. Id. at 2883.
21. Id.; see also Microsoft Corp. v. AT&T Corp., 550 U.S. 437, 455-456 (2007); Smith v.
United States, 507 U.S. 197, 204 (1993).
22. Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2881 (emphasis added). The statement should be viewed as
aspirational since, as noted above, the Court itself has hardly been consistent in applying the
presumption.
23. Id. at 2884.
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the deception originated, but upon purchases and sales of securities in the
United States."24 To support that conclusion, he looked to the language of
Section 10(b), which refers to manipulation and deception "in connection
with the purchase or sale of any security registered on a national securities
exchange or any security not so registered. ... With respect to the latter
phrase, which might be read to include securities listed on foreign
exchanges, Justice Scalia looked to other provisions of the Act that focused
on the location of a transaction as well as Congress's failure to address the
26
possibility of conflict with foreign laws and procedures. It was this
domestic "focus" that led Morrison to conclude that Section 10(b) reaches
securities fraud only in connection with sales in the United States.27
One might argue that the evidence Justice Scalia cited with respect to
the Exchange Act's focus should have been sufficient to support the Court's
holding without resort to a presumption against extraterritoriality.28 But if
one takes the Court at its word that the presumption is "a necessary first
step in the analysis," 29 Morrison significantly changes our understanding of
the presumption against extraterritoriality. Traditionally, courts applying
the presumption focused on the location of the conduct.30 As Justice
Holmes put it in American Banana, "the character of an act as lawful or
unlawful must be determined wholly by the law of the country where the
act is done." 3  Under Morrison, however, the location of the conduct is
irrelevant.3 2 Section 10(b) reaches fraudulent conduct anywhere in the
24. Id.
25. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2006); see Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2884. Scalia also looked to the
Act's prologue and the scope of its registration requirements. See id. at 2884-85.
26. Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2885-86.
27. Id. at 2888.
28. See id. at 2894 (Stevens, J., concurring) ("The real motor of the Court's opinion, it seems,
is not the presumption against extraterritoriality but rather the Court's belief that transactions on
domestic exchanges are 'the focus of the Exchange Act' and 'the objects of [its] solicitude."'). As
Professor Brilmayer points out, there is a tension between the Court's assertion in Part III of
Morrison that there is little evidence of congressional intent with respect to the Act's territorial
reach and its assertion in Part IV that there is clear evidence of congressional intent with respect to
the Act's domestic focus. Lea Brilmayer, The New Extraterritoriality: Morrison v. National
Australia Bank, Legislative Supremacy, and the Presumption Against Extraterritorial Application
ofAmerican Law, 40 SW. U. L. REv. 655, 668 (2011).
29. Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2884 n.9.
30. See William S. Dodge, Understanding the Presumption Against Extraterritoriality, 16
BERKELEY J. INT'L L. 85, 88 (1998). In two recent opinions, Justice Thomas (joined in each case
by Justice Scalia) has taken the similar view that the presumption is not applicable where the
prohibited conduct occurs in the United States. See Pasquantino v. United States, 544 U.S. 349,
371 (2005); Small v. United States, 544 U.S. 385,400 (2005) (Thomas, J., dissenting).
31. Am. Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347, 356 (1909).
32. Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2884.
690 [Vol. 40
MORRISON'S EFFECTS TEST
world so long as the sale occurs on an American exchange or otherwise
takes place in the United States. What is relevant instead is the location of
the transaction affected by the fraudulent conduct-in other words, the
location of the effects. Section 10(b) did not apply in Morrison, Justice
Scalia explained, because "the focus of the Exchange Act is not upon the
place where the deception originated, but upon purchases and sales of
securities in the United States."33
One might argue that Morrison still focuses on conduct, just different
conduct. Rather than looking to the fraud as the relevant conduct for
purposes of applying the presumption, it looks to the conduct of purchasing
or selling. The first problem with this reading is that it ignores the language
of the Exchange Act. Section 10(b) makes it unlawful "[t]o use or
employ ... any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance" in
connection with the domestic purchase or sale of a security.34 Section 10(b)
does not make it unlawful to purchase or sell a security by means of a
manipulative or deceptive device. To pretend that the sale rather than the
fraud is prohibited is to rewrite the statute. The second problem is that this
reading avoids the real question. It is often possible to recharacterize
effects as conduct. When the effects test was young, courts used to imagine
that the shooter accompanied a bullet across state lines so that his conduct
actually occurred in state where the effects were felt. But courts soon
abandoned the fiction and permitted regulation simply on the basis of
effects. The European Court of Justice still prefers to speak of an
anticompetitive agreement's "implementation" rather than its effects,37 but
it generally recognized that the ECJ has "accepted [the effects doctrine] in
all but name."38
One might also wonder how Morrison can be read to have adopted an
effects test when the opinion was so critical of the effects test developed by
33. Id.
34. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2006).
35. See, e.g., Simpson v. State, 17 S.E. 984, 985 (Ga. 1893) ("[If a man in the State of South
Carolina criminally fires a ball into the State of Georgia, the law regards him as accompanying the
ball, and as being represented by it, up to the point where it strikes.").
36. See, e.g., Strassheim v. Daily, 221 U.S. 280, 285 (1911) ("Acts done outside a
jurisdiction, but intended to produce and producing detrimental effects within it, justify a state in
punishing the cause of the harm as if he had been present at the effect, if the state should succeed
in getting him within its power."); RESTATEMENT OF THE CONFLICT OF LAWS § 65, cmt. a (1934)
("A state may impose a liability upon any person whose conduct produces consequences within
the state.").
37. See Case C-89/85, Ahlitr6m Osakeyhtio v. Comm'n, 1988 E.C.R. 5193, 5243.
38. ROSALYN HIGGINS, PROBLEMS AND PROCESS: INTERNATIONAL LAW AND How WE USE
IT 75 (Oxford Univ. Press 1994) (1993).
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the Second Circuit. 39  But it is important to remember that the Second
Circuit's effects test was significantly broader than Morrison's. The
Second Circuit, for example, applied the Exchange Act to transactions on a
foreign exchange that affected the price of U.S.-listed shares in the same
company.40 It also counted as "effects" the sending of misleading
information into the United States from abroad. 4 1 And it allowed a
combining of effects and conduct in the United States to determine whether
the U.S. interest was strong enough to justify application of the Exchange
Act.4 2 It was this broad effects test that Scalia condemned-in tandem with
the Second Circuit's conduct test-as "vague," "unpredictable," and "not
easy to administer." 4 3 In its place, Morrison substituted a narrower effects
test that turns solely on the location of the specific transaction affected by
the fraud."
Morrison's shifting the presumption against extraterritoriality to focus
on effects is cause for celebration. For one thing, this shift aligns the
presumption with its modern justification-that Congress "' is primarily
concerned with domestic conditions."' 4 5 As noted above, this appears to be
the sole justification for the presumption after Morrison.46 Concern with
"domestic conditions" must mean concern with domestic effects. When
Congress prohibits conduct-from securities fraud, to restraints of trade, to
environmental pollution-it does so to prevent harms that flow from such
conduct.47 This is confirmed by what Congress has done when place of the
conduct and the place of the effects diverge. In the antitrust context,
Congress has created a number of exceptions that permit anticompetitive
39. See Morrison v. Nat'l Australia Bank Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 2869, 2878-81 (2010).
40. See Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook, 405 F.2d 200, 206-08 (1968).
41. See Consolidated Gold Fields PLC v. Minorco, S.A., 871 F.2d 252, 262 (2d Cir. 1989);
Bersch v. Drexel Firestone, Inc., 519 F.2d 974, 991 (2d Cir. 1975).
42. See Itoba Ltd. v. Lep Group PLC, 54 F.3d 118, 122 (1995).
43. Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2879-80. Indeed, it would be fair to say that more of Justice
Scalia's venom was directed at the Second Circuit's conduct test than at its effects test.
44. Id. at 2886. Application of this test to listed securities is relatively straightforward. Its
application to unlisted securities, on the other hand, may prove to be as vague and unpredictable
as the Second Circuit's conduct and effects tests. See, e.g., Quail Cruises Ship Management Ltd.
v. Agencia de Viagens CVC Tur Limitada, 732 F. Supp. 2d 1345, 1350 (S.D. Fla. 2010) (closing
in Florida of transaction in unlisted securities would be insufficient under Morrison).
45. Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2877 (quoting EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 248
(1991)); see also id. (the presumption "rests on the perception that Congress ordinarily legislates
with respect to domestic, not foreign matters"); Smith v. United States, 507 U.S. 197, 204 n.5
(1993) (the presumption rests on "the commonsense notion that Congress generally legislates with
domestic concerns in mind"); Foley Bros. v. Filardo, 336 U.S. 281, 285 (1949) (the presumption
"is based on the assumption that Congress is primarily concerned with domestic conditions").
46. For a critical review of other possible justifications, see Dodge, supra note 30, at 112-23.
47. See id. at 118.
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activity in the United States so long as the effects of that activity are only
felt abroad.4 8 And, of course, in the securities fraud context, Congress has
prohibited not the use of "any manipulative or deceptive device or
contrivance," but only the use of such a device or contrivance "in
connection with the purchase or sale of any security registered on a national
securities exchange" or in connection with domestic transactions in unlisted
securities. 4 9 Not only is it reasonable to think that Congress is primarily
concerned with domestic effects, that concern has been manifested in
congressional legislation.
Refocusing the presumption against extraterritoriality on the location of
the effects also makes sense of past cases in which the Supreme Court has
applied some statutes extraterritorially but not others. After an early
misstep in American Banana,50 the Court has consistently applied U.S.
antitrust law extraterritoriality on the basis of effects." Similarly, the
Supreme Court in Steele v. Bulova Watch Co. applied the Lanham Act to
trademark infringement abroad, noting that the defendant's "operations and
their effects were not confined within the territorial limits of a foreign
nation" because the counterfeit watches sold in Mexico could affect the
value of Bulova's trademark in the United States.52 And Morrison has now
held that Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act applies extraterritorially to
foreign conduct that affects transactions in the United States.53
In contrast, the cases in which the Supreme Court has applied the
presumption against extraterritoriality over the past century have all been
ones in which there were no effects in the United States. Foley Bros. and
Aramco involved alleged violations of employment laws in foreign
countries, which is where the effects of such violations would have been
48. See, e.g., Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act of 1982, 15 U.S.C. §§ 6a & 45a(3)
(2006); Export Trading Company Act of 1982, 15 U.S.C. §§ 4001-16 (2006); Webb-Pomerene
Act of 1918, 15 U.S.C. §§ 61-66 (2006).
49. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2006); see Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2884-85.
50. See Am. Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347, 355-57 (1909).
51. See, e.g., F. Hoffman-La Roche Ltd. v. Empagran S.A., 542 U.S. 155, 165 (2004) ("[O]ur
courts have long held that application of our antitrust laws to foreign anticompetitive conduct is
nonetheless reasonable, and hence consistent with principles of prescriptive comity, insofar as
they reflect a legislative effort to redress domestic antitrust injury that foreign anticompetitive
conduct has caused."); Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764, 796 (1993) ("[lIt is well
established by now that the Sherman Act applies to foreign conduct that was meant to produce and
did in fact produce some substantial effect in the United States."); United States v. Sisal Sales
Corp., 274 U.S. 268, 276 (1927) (applying Sherman Act to conspirators who, "by their own
deliberate acts, here and elsewhere, they brought about forbidden results within the United
States.").
52. 344 U.S. 280, 286 (1952).
53. See supra notes 28-44 and accompanying text.
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felt.5 4  Indeed, Aramco distinguished Steele on the ground that "the
allegedly unlawful conduct had some effects within the United States.",5 In
Sale and Amerada Hess, the effects of the conduct were felt on the high
seas.56  And in Smith, the effects were felt in Antarctica.57  What had
appeared to be a vacillating and inconsistent approach to the presumption
against extraterritoriality becomes clear once we shift our gaze from the
location of the conduct to the location of the effects.
The next frontier in extraterritoriality litigation is likely to be RICO. 8
Applying Morrison, the Second Circuit held in Norex Petroleum Ltd v.
Access Industries, Inc. that RICO did not apply extraterritorially, but the
court did not examine the "focus" of the statute.59 Two district courts have
done so-one before Norex and one after-and concluded that the focus of
RICO is on domestic enterprises. 60 "It is plain on the face of the statute,"
the court noted in Cedeiho v. Intech Group Inc., that RICO "is focused on
how a pattern of racketeering affects an enterprise."6 1 "But nowhere does
the statute evidence any concern with foreign enterprises .... 62 This
meant that RICO would not apply to predicate acts of racketeering in the
United States where "the alleged enterprise and the impact of the predicate
activity upon it are entirely foreign." 63  The district court in European
Community v. RJR Nabisco, Inc. agreed. In language that paralleled Justice
Scalia's in Morrison, the district court noted that RICO "does not punish
the predicate acts of racketeering activity . .. but only racketeering activity
54. See EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244 (1991) (violation of Title VII in Saudi
Arabia); Foley Bros. v. Filardo, 336 U.S. 281 (1949) (violation of Eight Hour Law in Iraq). In
both cases, the plaintiff was an American citizen, but international law has long distinguished
between effects within a country's territory and effects upon a country's nationals. The latter is
not a widely accepted basis for jurisdiction to prescribe except in the context of crimes like
terrorism that target a person on the basis of nationality. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN
RELATIONS LAW § 402 cmt. g (discussing passive personality principle).
55. Aramco, 499 U.S. at 252. Aramco also noted the Lanham Act's broad definition of
"commerce," id at 252-53, but such boilerplate definitions have generally been considered
insufficient to overcome the presumption. See Morrison v. Nat'1 Australia Bank Ltd., 130 S. Ct.
2869, 2882 (2010); see also Aramco, 499 U.S. at 251-53.
56. See Sale v. Haitian Centers Council, Inc., 509 U.S. 155, 173-74 (1993); Argentine
Republic v. Amerada Hess Shipping Corp., 488 U.S. 428, 440-41 (1989).
57. Smith v. United States, 507 U.S. 197, 203-04 (1993).
58. Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organization Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1961-68 (2006).
59. 631 F.3d 29 (2d Cir. 2010) (per curiam).
60. See European Community v. RJR Nabisco, Inc., 2011 WL 843957 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 8);
Cedeflo v. Intech Group Inc., 733 F. Supp. 2d 471 (S.D.N.Y. 2010).
61. Cedello, 733 F. Supp. 2d at 473.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 474.
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in connection with an 'enterprise.'" "Because the 'focus' of RICO is the
'enterprise,"' the court concluded, "a RICO 'enterprise' must be a
'domestic enterprise."' 65  Thus, RICO should not apply to racketeering
activity in the United States that causes effects abroad in or through a
foreign enterprise. Norex, Cedeiho, and European Community each involved
predicate acts in the United States but no domestic enterprise and no
domestic effects. Given RICO's focus on domestic enterprises, each was
properly dismissed under Morrison.
By the same reasoning, RICO should apply to racketeering activity
abroad that causes effects in the United States on or through a domestic
enterprise. The focus of RICO is on domestic enterprises, and under
Morrison the location of the conduct is irrelevant. 6 This means the district
court in United States v. Philip Morris USA, Inc. was wrong to release
British American Tobacco (BATCo) from the court's final order on the
ground that RICO did not apply after Morrison.6 7 The court seems to have
focused on Morrison's rejection of the Second Circuit's effects test,68
without recognizing that Morrison itself adopted a narrower effects test.
Ironically, the Philip Morris court quoted Cedeiho's observation that RICO
"is focused on how a pattern of racketeering affects an enterprise,"6 9 but
seemed to forget its own findings of fact five years earlier. In 2006, the
same district court specifically found that defendants had established a
RICO enterprise in the United States70 and that "BATCo's activities and
statements furthered the Enterprise's overall scheme to defraud, which had
a tremendous impact on the United States." 7 1 Those findings are sufficient
to establish RICO liability after Morrison irrespective of where the
predicate acts occurred.72
64. European Community, 2011 WL 843957, at *5.
65. Id.
66. See id. at *4 (noting that under Morrison the "focus [of a statute] is not necessarily the
'bad act,' or the actus reus, prohibited by the statute").
67. 2011 WL 1252662 (D.D.C. Mar. 28).
68. Id. at *3 & n.5, *5.
69. Id. at *4 (quoting Cedefio v. Intech Group Inc., 733 F. Supp. 2d 471, 473 (S.D.N.Y.
2010)).
70. United States v. Philip Morris USA, Inc., 449 F. Supp. 2d 1, 867-72 (D.D.C. 2006).
71. Id at 873.
72. The district court's decision is particularly odd given that the Supreme Court denied
BATCo's petition for certiorari just four days after Morrison rather than remanding for
reconsideration. British American Tobacco (investments) Ltd. v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 3502
(2010). The Court again refused to grant, vacate, and remand in light of Morrison on a petition




In sum, Morrison turns the presumption against extraterritoriality into
an effects test. It counsels courts to ignore the location of the prohibited
conduct and examine the "focus" of the statute.73 Because Congress 'is
primarily concerned with domestic conditions,"' 74 the focus of a statute
will most often be-as it was in Morrison-on preventing harmful,
domestic effects.
73. Morrison v. Nat'1 Australia Bank Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 2869, 2884 (2010).
74. Id. at 2877 (quoting EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 248 (1991)).
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